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Cultural evolutionary models have identified a range of conditions under
which social learning (copying others) is predicted to be adaptive relative
to asocial learning (learning on one’s own), particularly in humans where
socially learned information can accumulate over successive generations.
However, cultural evolution and behavioural economics experiments have
consistently shown apparently maladaptive under-utilization of social infor-
mation in Western populations. Here we provide experimental evidence of
cultural variation in people’s use of social learning, potentially explaining
this mismatch. People in mainland China showed significantly more social
learning than British people in an artefact-design task designed to assess the
adaptiveness of social information use. People in Hong Kong, and Chinese
immigrants in the UK, resembled British people in their social information
use, suggesting a recent shift in these groups from social to asocial learning
due to exposure to Western culture. Finally, Chinese mainland participants
responded less than other participants to increased environmental change
within the task. Our results suggest that learning strategies in humans are cul-
turally variable and not genetically fixed, necessitating the study of the ‘social
learning of social learning strategies’ whereby the dynamics of cultural
evolution are responsive to social processes, such as migration, education
and globalization.1. Introduction
When is it adaptive to copyothers, rather thango it alone?While social learningand
social influence have been topics of longstanding interest in the social sciences [1,2],
only recently have evolutionary anthropologists, biologists and psychologists
examined the adaptive basis of social learning (copying solutions to problems
from others) relative to asocial learning (solving problems independently, e.g. via
trial-and-error), using both formal theoretical models and controlled laboratory
experiments inmultiple species [3].While initially social learningwas seen as infor-
mationally ‘parasitic’ [4], with social learners ‘scrounging’ information produced at
some cost by asocial learners, recent models have revealed a range of conditions
underwhich social learningcan theoreticallyenhance the fitness of both individuals
andpopulations [5–10].Moreover, humansare thought topossess social learningof
uniquely high fidelity, allowing us to accumulate socially learned knowledge and
skills over successive generations in awayother species cannot [11–14]. This cumu-
lative cultural evolution, it is argued, has allowed our species to adapt rapidly to
novel and diverse environments across the planet [13,14].
(a) (b)
Figure 1. Screenshots of the virtual arrowhead task in (a) English and (b) Chinese. Participants engage in trial-and-error asocial learning by directly manipulating
the attributes (height, width, thickness, shape and colour) using the boxes along the top of the screen, or copy one of the asocial-learning-only demonstrators using
the buttons on the left of the screen. Once the participant is happy with their design, they click the HUNT button to test their arrowhead and receive a score out of
1000 calories. This is added to their cumulative season score, and they are also given their group rank relative to the five demonstrators based on season scores.
(Online version in colour.)
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Proc.R.Soc.B
282:20142209
2However, when the predictions of theoretical models have
been tested using controlled laboratory experiments with real
people, several independent research groups have found that
people copy less than they should do if they were maximizing
their payoffs [15–22]. This has been found with participants
from the UK [15,18], USA [17,20,21], Germany [16] and
Sweden [19] using different tasks, as well as in various
games conducted by experimental economists in Western
Europe and USA [22], suggesting that this finding is not a
peculiarity of a particular task or procedure.
It may, however, be a peculiarity of the participant
sample used in these studies, who are all from so-called
WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, Democratic)
countries [23]. Indeed, several lines of circumstantial evidence
suggest that human social learning is cross-culturally variable,
with people in the West less likely to copy others than people
from East Asia [24]. Western education emphasizes indivi-
dual discovery and creativity, whereas East Asian education
emphasizes rote learning from authority [25]. The adoption
of consumer products shows less social influence in Western
than East Asian countries [26]. Westerners are described
as more individualistic/independent, while East Asians are
described as more collectivistic/interdependent [27], dimen-
sions which intuitively map on to asocial and social learning,
respectively. Finally, experiments conducted by social psychol-
ogists have shown greater social influence in collectivistic East
Asian societies than individualistic Western societies [28],
although the tasks used in such studies are limited in their abil-
ity to determine the adaptiveness of different learning strategies
due to participant-deception and simple tasks with solutions
that are intuitively obvious [21].
The possibility that human learning strategies are cross-
culturally variable not only potentially resolves the aforemen-
tioned mismatch between theory and data, but also challenges
the explicit or implicit assumptions of many theoretical models
that learning strategies are species-universal, are under fixed
genetic control, and change via natural selection. It is often
assumed, for example, that ‘an individual’s position on this con-
tinuum [of social vs. asocial learning] is a genetically heritable
trait’ [5, p. 131], or that ‘Which [learning] strategy is used
is genetically determined for each individual’ [6, p. 728].Similarly, claims by comparative researchers that ‘humans’ are
unique in their social learning capacities compared to other
species [11,12] implicitly extrapolate from one cultural sample
to the entire human species. To date, fewmodels have explicitly
examined the social learning of learning strategies [29,30], and
fewexperiments have examined the adaptiveness of social learn-
ing in non-WEIRD populations [10,31]. Of the latter, one study
[10] found that Japanese participants successfully avoidedmala-
daptive producer–scrounger dynamics through their use of
social learning, although the study did not test whether the
level of social learning was optimal. Another study in Bolivia
[31] found similar sub-optimal social information use as in
Western populations. In both studies, the lackofWestern control
groups precludes a direct comparison between cultures.
Here we provide the first direct cross-cultural East–West
comparison of the adaptiveness of human social learning,
with no participant-deception and with a challenging task
with no intuitively obvious solution. This task is designed to
reflect real-life learning about complex, cognitively opaque
technological artefacts typical of cumulative culture, and has
previously been shown to elicit lower-than-optimal levels of
social learning in a Western sample [15]. It was administered
in four cultural groups along a continuum ofWestern–Eastern
influence: (i) White British students from the United Kingdom
(group ‘UK’); (ii) Chinese immigrants raised in China currently
studying in the UK (‘CI’); (iii) Chinese students raised and
studying in Hong Kong (‘HK’), and (iv) Chinese students
raised and studying in the culturally traditional and homo-
geneous Chao Zhou region of the Chinese mainland (‘CM’).
Via a computer program, participants designed ‘virtual arrow-
heads’ over three seasons each comprising 30 hunts, or
opportunities to improve and test their arrowhead (figure 1).
After each hunt, they received a payoff in calories and were
rewarded monetarily based on their accumulated payoff over
all three seasons. On each hunt, participants could copy the
design of one of five asocial-learning-only demonstrators,
given information about those demonstrators’ performance.
This permitted payoff-biased social learning [15] and elimi-
nated potentially maladaptive producer–scrounger dynamics
[9]. Seasons 1 and 2 featured constant environments (the
optimal arrowhead values did not change), while Season 3
rspb.royalsociet
3introduced within-season environmental changewhich theory
predicts should reduce reliance on social learning [32], and
which was used to test the within-task flexibility of learning
strategies. Our key questions are whether all four cultural
groups exhibit the same or different frequencies of social
learning, and how this impacted upon their payoffs.ypublishing.org
Proc.R.Soc.B
282:201422092. Material and methods
(a) Participants
Seventy-six British participants (40 female, mean age 20.38 years,
s.d. ¼ 2.71) and 70 recent Chinese immigrants to the UK (48
female, mean age 20.49 years, s.d. ¼ 2.33) were recruited from
DurhamUniversity’s student population. TheChinese immigrants
were almost exclusively fromChina’s three largest cities, Shanghai,
Beijing andGuangzhou, andmoved to the UKwithin the previous
1–2 years to attend university. The Hong Kong sample comprised
73 participants (34 females, mean age 20.26, s.d. ¼ 1.77) studying
at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. The Chinese mainland
sample comprised 73 participants (37 females, mean age 21.15,
s.d. ¼ 1.37) studying at Chao Zhou Normal University in Chao
Zhou, a relatively small city of 2.6 million inhabitants in the
same province (Guangdong) as Hong Kong and who spoke
the same language (Cantonese) as the Hong Kong sample (see
the electronic supplementary material for further details of
sample comparability). Five additional asocial-learning-only
demonstrators were recruited for each of the four cultures.
Participants were paid a flat fee for turning up, with monet-
ary increments added according to how well they performed. UK
and CI participants were paid £8 for taking part, with up to £4.20
more available according to their success in the task (7p for every
1000 calories obtained after the first 10 000 calories in each
season). HK participants were paid a flat fee of HK$100 (£8)
and increments of HK$5 up to HK$50 (£4). CM participants
were paid RMB60 (£6) and RMB3 increments up to RMB30 (£3).
(b) Task/procedure
All participants completed a computer-based task to design a
virtual arrowhead which is then used on a series of hunting trips
(see [15], figure 1 and the electronic supplementary material for
screenshots of task and instructions). Participants enter five attri-
butes that independently determine their arrowhead design:
three continuous (height, width and thickness) ranging from 1 to
100 arbitrary units, and two discrete (shape and colour) which
can each take one of four values. The overall effectiveness of the
arrowhead is a function of how close its attributes are to hidden
optimal values (except colour, which was neutral). These optimal
designs can be seen as those most suited to the participant’s
particular ‘environment’. The continuous attributes each had
bimodal fitness functions creating a multimodal fitness landscape,
such that there were eight locally optimal arrowhead designs of
varying maximum fitness. The global optimum gave a score of
1000 calories. Seven other peaks gave slightly lower maximum
scores. The greater the deviation from these optima the lower the
score. Small normally distributed random error was added to
the scores to increase realism.
The aim of the task for the participant is to accumulate as high a
score as possible over a series of trials (‘hunts’) by locating the opti-
mal value of each attribute. Following a five-hunt asocial-learning-
only practice session, there were three seasons of hunting, each
comprising 30 hunts, or 30 opportunities to modify and test the
arrowhead. Participants improve their design either by trial-and-
error asocial learning, i.e. modifying arrowhead attributes in
response to changes in score over successive hunts, or social learn-
ing, i.e. copying the design of another participant. Following [15],
we ran separate groups of asocial-learning-only demonstratorsthat experimental participants could subsequently copy, rather
than allowing participants to copy each other in real time. This
design provided more comparable data across participants
and eliminated producer–scrounger dynamics by ensuring the
constant presence of pure information producers. To avoid
ingroup–outgroup effects and increase external validity we ran
separate groups of five demonstrators for each of the four cultures,
such that UK participants copied UK demonstrators, HK partici-
pants copied HK demonstrators, etc. Participants could choose,
on each hunt except the first of each season, to copy the arrowhead
design that a demonstrator had used on the equivalent hunt (e.g. on
hunt 5, participants could copy the arrowhead that one demonstra-
tor had used on their hunt 5). Participants were informed of the
cumulative score of each demonstrator on the equivalent hunt,
allowing (but not requiring) participants to preferentially copy
the highest-scoring demonstrator. Choosing to copy entailed the
replacement of the participant’s arrowheadwith that of the demon-
strator with no opportunity to further modify the arrowhead on
that hunt, to prevent both social and asocial learning occuring on
the same hunt. Demonstrators and all experimental participants
experienced identical season/hunt structures and fitness functions.
After participants have chosen whether to modify their arrow-
head or not via asocial or social learning, they click aHUNTbutton
to see howmany calories their arrowhead yields out of 1000. Their
hunt score is added to their cumulative season score, and the
participant is shown their rank relative to the five demonstrators.
At the start of each season, participants’ season scores are set to
zero and the fitness functions are changed to new hidden values.
In Seasons 1 and 2, fitness functions did not change during the
30 hunts. In Season 3, fitness functions changed to new random
values without warning three times, on hunts 10, 15 and 23.
Participants were informed that fitness functions did not change
during Seasons 1 and 2, and may change during Season 3, but
not on which hunts it would change.
After all three seasons were over, participants completed an
on-screen individualism–collectivism questionnaire taken from
the study of Sivadas et al. [33], rating their agreement on seven-
point Likert scales to statements related to individualism (e.g. ‘I
am a unique individual’) and collectivism (e.g. ‘If a co-worker
gets a prize, I would feel proud’). The entire experiment took no
more than 1 h to complete. UK and CI participants completed ver-
sions of the tasks in English (the latter had IELTS scores of more
than 6.5). A Chinese version of the computer task was produced
for the HK (traditional characters) and CM (simplified characters)
participants using professional translators and was verified by the
Hong Kong authors.
(c) Design
Outcome variables are the frequency of social learning during a
season (the proportion of the 29 hunts on which the participants
chose to copy) and cumulative score at the end of the season
(out of amaximumof 30 000 calories), for each of the three seasons.
Predictor variables are culture (UK, CI, HK or CM), age, sex and
measures of individualism and collectivism (analysed separately
given evidence that they vary independently [34]). Quasi-binomial
and linear regression analyses were conducted using the glm
and lme commands in R v. 3.1.0 [35]. Quasi-binomial rather than
binomial models were used for copying frequency data due to
underdispersion [36] caused by many participants never copying.3. Results
(a) Cultural variation in copying frequency
Both Seasons 1 and 2 showed similar patterns of copying,
with CM participants copying more frequently than UK,
HK and CI participants, who did not significantly differ
UK
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Figure 2. Mean copying frequencies for (a) Season 1 and (b) Season 2, which both featured no within-season environmental change and (c) Season 3, which
featured within-season environmental change. UK, British; HK, Hong Kong; CI, Chinese immigrant; CM, Chinese mainland. Error bars show 95% CIs.
Table 1. Best-ﬁtting regression models predicting copying frequency from culture and sex, separately for each season. Reference group for culture is UK, for sex
is male. UK, British; HK, Hong Kong; CI, Chinese immigrant; CM, Chinese mainland. Models are quasi-binomial due to underdispersion in the data caused by
several participants never copying.
Season predictor B s.e. t p(>jtj)
1 (intercept) 21.83 0.21 28.84 ,0.0001***
HK 0.00 0.26 20.01 0.99
CI 0.15 0.25 0.60 0.55
CM 0.77 0.23 3.31 0.0011**
sex 0.36 0.18 2.03 0.0437*
2 (intercept) 21.76 0.23 27.81 ,0.0001***
HK 20.02 0.28 20.08 0.93
CI 20.13 0.29 20.45 0.66
CM 0.81 0.25 3.20 0.0016**
sex 0.34 0.19 1.75 0.0812†
3 (intercept) 21.18 0.17 26.74 ,0.0001***
HK 0.26 0.24 1.09 0.28
CI 20.02 0.25 20.08 0.94
CM 0.44 0.24 1.86 0.0642†
Signiﬁcance codes: ***,0.001, **,0.01, *,0.05, †,0.1.
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4(figure 2). Table 1 shows that for both Seasons 1 and 2 the
best-fitting regression model retained culture and sex as sig-
nificant predictors, with full models also containing age,
individualism and collectivism showing no better fit than
the culture-sex models (see the electronic supplementary
material, tables S1–S3, for full model comparisons).
For Season 1, table 1 shows that the odds of a CM partici-
pant copying were e0.77 ¼ 2.16 (95% CI[1.38, 3.42]) times the
odds of a UK participant copying; HK and CI participants
showed comparable copying frequencies to UK participants.
For Season 2, the odds of a CM participant copying rose
slightly to e0.81 ¼ 2.25 (95% CI[1.38, 3.73]) times the odds of
a UK participant copying, and HK and CI participants
were again comparable to UK participants. The effect of sex
was roughly half that of culture (table 1). The odds of a
female participant copying in Season 1 was e0.36 ¼ 1.43
(95% CI[1.01, 2.01]) times that of a male participant, and in
Season 2 was e0.34 ¼ 1.40 (95% CI[0.96, 2.06]) times that of a
male participant.The introduction of within-season environmental change
in Season 3 revealed further cultural variation. While CM
participants again copied more frequently than the other par-
ticipants, the difference between CM and UK participants
only approached significance (table 1), and a model includ-
ing culture as a predictor did not fit the data significantly
better than a null model (electronic supplementary material,
table S3). As shown in figure 2, this is because the other cultural
groups copied more frequently compared with previous
seasons, bringing their copying up to near CM levels. Accord-
ingly, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests comparing Season 2 versus 3
copying frequencies showed a significant increase in UK
(r¼ 0.33, p, 0.001), HK (r¼ 0.42, p, 0.001) and CI (r ¼ 0.21,
p ¼ 0.0129) participants and no change in CM (r ¼ 0.04,
p ¼ 0.65) participants.
See the electronic supplementary material for analyses
showing that participants were consistent in their social
information use across seasons (electronic supplementary
material, table S4) and predominantly employed payoff bias
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Figure 3. The relationship between frequency of copying and relative score for (a) Season 1, (b) Season 2 and (c) Season 3. Score is relative to the score of the best
demonstrator in that cultural group; relative scores less than 1 indicate lower scores than the best demonstrator, greater than 1 indicate higher scores. Coloured lines
and points show separate linear regressions for each culture. UK, British (red, squares); HK, Hong Kong (green, circles); CI, Chinese immigrant (orange, triangles); CM,
Chinese mainland (blue, diamonds). (Online version in colour.)
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5(electronic supplementary material, table S5), that CM partici-
pants copied more throughout the entirety of Seasons 1 and 2
(electronic supplementary material, figure S1), and a categori-
cal breakdown of participants based on copying frequency
(electronic supplementary material, table S6).
(b) Relationship between copying frequency and score
Cumulative score at the end of each season is a measure of
both performance within the game and real-world monetary
payoff. To better understand the context of the cultural vari-
ation in copying frequency, we can ask whether copying is
adaptive, i.e. led to higher scores/payoffs. Recall that each
cultural group could learn from a different group of demon-
strators, specific to their culture. Inspection of demonstrator
scores (electronic supplementary material, table S7) shows
that while they are on average similar across cultures, those
of the highest-scoring demonstrator sometimes varied.
Given that socially learning participants are employing
payoff-bias and therefore selectively copying highest-scoring
demonstrators, we must take this variation into account when
assessing the adaptiveness of copying. We therefore calcu-
lated the relative score for each participant in each season,
i.e. their cumulative score divided by the best demonstrator
score for their cultural group. Relative scores less than
1 indicate that the participant performed worse than the
best demonstrator, relative scores greater than 1 indicate
superior performance to the best demonstrator.
Linear regression analyses (figure 3) show that, for Season 1,
copying frequency significantly and positively predicts
relative score for the UK (b ¼ 0.0043, s.e. ¼ 0.0016, t74¼ 2.74,
p ¼ 0.0077) and CM (b ¼ 0.0030, s.e. ¼ 0.0014, t71¼ 2.08, p ¼
0.0408) participants, but not CI (b ¼ 0.0010, s.e.¼ 0.0018,
t68¼ 0.53, p ¼ 0.60) or HK (b ¼ 20.0010, s.e. ¼ 0.0020,
t71¼ 20.50, p ¼ 0.62) participants. As indicated in the elec-
tronic supplementary material, table S7, this is because the
best demonstrator in the latter two groups performed no
better than the average asocial learner in those groups. For
Season 2, copying frequency significantly and positively
predicts relative score for all four groups (UK: b ¼ 0.0039,
s.e. ¼ 0.0011, t74¼ 3.46, p ¼ 0.0009; CM: b ¼ 0.0036, s.e. ¼
0.0012, t71¼ 3.13, p ¼ 0.0025; CI: b ¼ 0.0031, s.e.¼ 0.0015,
t68¼ 2.08, p ¼ 0.0416; HK: b ¼ 0.0034, s.e. ¼ 0.0014, t71¼ 2.41,
p ¼ 0.0185). For Season 3, copying significantly and positivelypredicts relative score in the UK participants (b ¼ 0.0033,
s.e. ¼ 0.0013, t74¼ 2.51, p ¼ 0.0141), it approached significance
in the CM (b ¼ 0.0021, s.e.¼ 0.0012, t71¼ 1.70, p ¼ 0.0943) and
HK (b ¼ 0.0019, s.e. ¼ 0.0012, t71¼ 1.65, p ¼ 0.10) participants,
and CI participants showed no relationship (b ¼ 20.0011,
s.e. ¼ 0.0014, t68¼ 20.80, p ¼ 0.43).
See the electronic supplementary material for analyses
showing within-season changes in score (electronic sup-
plementary material, figures S2 and S3) and analyses of
absolute rather than relative scores (electronic supplementary
material, figure S4 and table S7).4. Discussion
Herewe compared four cultural groups varying along anEast–
West continuum in their use of social versus asocial learning to
solve a challenging task designed to reflect real-life learning
about complex, cognitively opaque technological artefacts,
typical of our species’ cumulative culture. Unlike social psy-
chology studies of cross-cultural variation in social learning
[28], there was no participant-deception and no intuitively
obvious solution. Unlike previous cultural evolution studies
of the adaptiveness of social learning [10,15–22,31], we directly
compared non-Western (CM) and Western (UK) samples
using the same task and design, as well as intermediate
Western-influenced (HK) and immigrant (CI) samples.
Throughout the first two seasons of huntingCMparticipants
copied significantly more than UK, HK and CI participants.
In order to maximize external validity, we ran different,
culturally specific groups of demonstrators from whom exper-
imental participants could learn. While this was more realistic
than presenting identical and fictional demonstrators to all
participants, it gave rise to unanticipated variation in the adap-
tiveness of social learning. In Season 1, social learning was
adaptive relative to asocial learning in UK and CM participants
because their highest-scoring demonstrators out-performed the
average asocial learner, whereas HK and CI participants’
highest-scoring demonstrators performed no better than the
average asocial learner. We think it unlikely that these differ-
ences in demonstrator performance generated the observed
differences in social learning, because (i) even if this explained
the lower HK and CI copying, it could not explain the lower
UK copying, and (ii) in neither HK or CI participants was
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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6there a significant negative relationship between score and copy-
ing, so even these participants could achieve the same score
through frequent copying without the effort and risk of asocial
learning. Moreover, (iii) in Season 2 all four cultural groups
had highest-scoring demonstrators who out-performed the
average asocial learner, resulting in a significant positive
relationship between copying and score. Nevertheless, the
same pattern of copying emerged as in Season 1, with CM
participants copying roughly twice as often as the others.
We have therefore replicated, in our UK sample, the sub-
optimal under-utilization of social information observed in
the UK sample of a previous study that used the same task
[15], and the Western samples of other studies that used differ-
ent tasks [16–22]. Our finding that CM participants adaptively
exploit social information to a greater extent suggests that
Western sub-optimal underuse of social information may be
part of broader cultural variation in learning strategies.
Future cultural evolution experiments should pay greater
attention to the cultural backgrounds of participants and use
caution in generalizing findings to the entire species, a point
that has been made for human behavioural studies in general
[23]. We anticipate future studies going beyond the small
number of specific populations that we studied here, and com-
piling amulti-population catalogue of social learning strategies
used in diverse situations. We also found higher copying fre-
quencies in female than male participants, a sex difference
that has not been previously found using this task [15] but
which deserves further examination.
Season 3 featured within-season environmental variation,
which we predicted should reduce reliance on social learning
given the risk of copying out-dated information [32]. Against
expectations, not only did CM participants maintain their rela-
tively high rates of copying, the other participants increased
their copying frequencies to near CM levels. This increased
copying may instead represent a ‘copy-when-uncertain’ social
learning strategy, as found in previous experiments [17,18]. It
also suggests that the cultural variation in copying observed
in Seasons 1 and 2 is not fixed, and may change in response
to task characteristics (albeit change in different ways in differ-
ent cultures; it may be that Western or Westernized people are
more responsive to changing conditions: [24]).
Despite their Chinese heritage,HK andCI participantswere
comparable to UKparticipants in their copying frequencies.We
suggest that CI and HK participants have recently undergone
a shift from Eastern ‘high social learning’ to Western ‘high
asocial learning’ due to the increasing Westernization of
China, especially in Hong Kong and the home cities of the CI
participants (Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou), or, for the
CI participants, direct Western influence from living in
the UK. CM participants, coming from a relatively traditional
and homogeneous region of China, have yet to experience this
shift, although we might predict this in the coming decades
with the increasing Westernization of China. Longitudinal
studies tracking shifts in learning strategies in migrants as
they move from East to West, or West to East, would provide
a definitive test of this shift.The presence of cultural variation in social information
use, and potentially rapid changes in learning strategies in
one generation or less, demands a greater understanding of
the cultural processes underpinning learning strategies and
the construction of models whereby learning strategies are
themselves socially learned. Interestingly, recent studies
suggest that social learning in non-human species may be
influenced by individuals’ early developmental cues [37] or
past learning histories [38], echoing our conclusion. In
humans, initial steps have been made to model the learning
of learning strategies [29,30], but the full implications of
this remain unexplored. This may shed light on exactly
what ‘Westernization’ entails, and why it affects learning
strategies in the way suggested by our results. Contrary to
previous studies [17], individualism/collectivism was here
unrelated to asocial/social learning (although these measures
did not vary culturally in the expected manner: electronic
supplementary material, figure S5). In any case, explanations
in terms of individualism/collectivism simply beg the ques-
tion of where variation in individualism/collectivism came
from. Recent hypotheses for the origin of cultural variation
in human learning and cognition include variation in histori-
cal rates of environmental change [24], subsistence practices
[39] or pathogen prevalence [40]. A combination of theoreti-
cal models, laboratory experiments, historical data and
longitudinal field studies are needed to further study the
cultural (rather than genetic) evolution of learning strategies.
Social learning is thought to be key to understanding the
uniqueness and evolutionary success of our species [11–14].
Such claims are often made by comparing learning strategies
across species [11,12], and constructing theoretical models of
the natural selection of genetically fixed learning strategies
[4–6]. However, our finding of significant cultural variation
in the frequency, adaptiveness and responsiveness of social
learning suggests that there is no ‘species-typical’ pattern of
social learning in humans (and potentially nor in other species),
and no fixed genetic basis for learning strategies. Consequen-
tly, understanding human cultural evolution will require
greater insight into how social processes such as migration,
acculturation, education and globalization have created, and
are currently changing, the means by which human culture
is transmitted.Ethics statement. The study was approved by the Research Ethics Com-
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